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1  Introduction
In the case of Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 
a majority of Constitutional Court judges held that an organ of state was 
not liable in delict for a successful tenderer’s out-of-pocket losses following 
the setting aside of the tender because of a bona fide error on the part of the 
organ of state in the tender process. In reaching this conclusion the Court 
ruled that the organ of state’s negligent but bona fide conduct in the public 
tender process was not wrongful since it owed no legal duty to tenderers, 
whether successful or unsuccessful, to avoid such losses and that there 
were no public policy considerations that justified the recognition of such a 
duty.3 From a public procurement perspective, this judgment is unfortunate. 
As I will indicate below, Moseneke DCJ’s majority judgment is based on a 
number of assumptions which are highly contestable, as the joint minority 
judgment of Langa CJ and O’Regan J points out. Furthermore, the major-
ity judgment holds implications for public procurement that may largely 
undermine some of the very public policy considerations upon which it is 
based.
In this contribution I analyse the policy considerations that motivated the 
majority judgment from a public procurement perspective. I argue that the 
dissenting minority judgment of Langa CJ and O’Regan J (Mokgoro J concur-
ring) is to be preferred over the majority judgment, because the dissenting 
judgment is not only much more sensitive to the general realities of public pro-
curement, but specifically the realities of South African public procurement. 
In the final analysis I argue that despite my misgivings about the ruling in the 
Steenkamp matter, the problem does not lie there, but rather in the hitherto 
fairly unsophisticated approach to remedies following the judicial review of 
public tender decisions. In order to overcome the problems illustrated by the 
Steenkamp case, we should focus our attention on the development of appro-
priate and focused judicial review remedies within the public procurement 
context. The recent judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Millennium 
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Waste Management v Chairperson Tender Board4 provides a solid foundation 
for such a development.
2  The Steenkamp case5
2 1 The facts
In 995 the Tender Board6 invited tenders for the supply of a payment 
system for welfare grants in the eastern Cape.7 eight tenders were received 
including one by Balraz Technologies (Pty) Ltd (“Balraz”), an ostensibly 
“wholly owned black company especially incorporated”8 for the purpose of 
tendering for this particular government contract.9 Despite the reservations of 
two technical committees about Balraz’s technical ability to effectively render 
the services under tender, the Tender Board decided to award one part of the 
contract0 to Balraz in March 996. Balraz forthwith accepted the award and 
about two months later the Department of Health and Welfare placed an order 
for the tendered services with Balraz under the resultant contract. However, 
before Balraz could render the services, but after it commenced preparations 
for its performance, an unsuccessful tenderer approached the High Court for 
the review of the tender award.3 The review succeeded and in June 997 
the contract was set aside by the reviewing court on the grounds that the 
decision to award the contract was tainted by an “unwarranted adherence to a 
fixed principle”; “a misconception of the nature of the discretion conferred”; 
the consideration of irrelevant factors; a failure to consider relevant facts and 
gross unreasonableness.4 In Steenkamp the parties agreed that while the 
award of the tender was administratively unfair it was done in a bona fide 
4 007 JOL 70 (SCA)
5 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board of the Eastern Cape 004 JOL 393 (Ck); Steenkamp NO v 
Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 006 3 SA 5 (SCA); Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, 
Eastern Cape 007 3 SA  (CC)  
6 Initially the call for tenders was done by the National Tender Board, but that body was replaced during 
the course of the tender process by the Provincial Tender Board, which was constituted late in 995  
Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 007 3 SA  (CC) para 5
7 Para 4
8 Para 59, but cf Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd v Eastern Cape Province 999  SA 34 (CkH) 34D-F 
where doubt was raised about the exact stakeholding in Balraz
9 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 007 3 SA  (CC) para 6  A second line of 
argument as to whether the tender board’s actions were wrongful in a delictual sense was whether Balraz 
in fact submitted a valid tender in light of the fact that Balraz was incorporated and obtained a certificate 
to commence business only after it submitted, in its own name, its tender  While the case was primarily 
decided on the basis of this second argument in the High Court, that argument progressively declined in 
prominence to the extent that the majority in the Constitutional Court decided the matter wholly on the 
wrongfulness argument and held that “no purpose will be served in arriving at a firm conclusion on the 
validity of the tender,” para 61  
0 The Tender Board decided to split the contract into three parts in order to allow it “to spread the work as 
much as possible” (Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd v Eastern Cape Province 999  SA 34 (CkH) 
334B)
 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 007 3 SA  (CC) para 7
 Para 7
3 Para 8
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manner.5 The reviewing court did not remit the matter to the Tender Board 
for reconsideration, but ordered it to call for fresh tenders should the province 
still require the relevant services.6 However, when the Tender Board did call 
for fresh tenders Balraz was unable to tender again since it had by this time 
been placed under final liquidation.7
Balraz’s liquidator subsequently claimed damages in contract from the 
Department of Health and Welfare, in its capacity as the contracting authority, 
and in delict from the Tender Board.8 exceptions by the respective defend-
ants succeeded against the contractual claim,9 but failed against the claim 
in delict.0 The parties agreed to separate the issues underlying the delictual 
claim and asked the court to adjudicate only on “whether the defendant’s con-
duct was wrongful and, if so, whether it was also negligent.”
2 2 The High Court judgment22
The High Court held that in order to determine whether the Tender Board’s 
conduct was wrongful in a delictual sense it had to establish whether there 
was a legal duty on the Tender Board towards successful tenderers like Balraz 
to avoid causing pure economic loss in the form of out-of-pocket expenses.3 
The Court found that despite a number of considerations that favoured the 
recognition of a legal duty on the Tender Board to exercise its statutory 
powers properly and with due care, no such duty arose in the present matter.4 
The single reason for this finding was that Balraz did not exist at the time it 
submitted the tender and therefore did not submit a valid tender.5 As a result 
there was no legal relationship between Balraz and the Tender Board. Since 
the Tender Board’s conduct could consequently not be said to be wrongful it 
was not necessary for the Court to rule on negligence.
5 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 007 3 SA  (CC) para 36  The reviewing 
court was less sympathetic in its characterisation of the Tender Board’s conduct  especially Pickard JP 
voiced stringent criticism of the Tender Board’s conduct, which at times seems to question its motives, 
Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd v Eastern Cape Province 1999 1 SA 324 (CkH) 348D-E: “On a read-
ing of the record of the proceedings of  March 996 one cannot avoid concluding that the decision 
to approve the successful tenders was taken to promote what was perceived as RDP, if not for other 
unexpressed reasons … ;” 348I: “Although it is not possible to make a definitive finding in this regard, 
I am left with the uneasy feeling that outside influences may have played some role in their decision;” 
352I: “The technical committee’s report was simply ridden roughshod over”  However, despite its very 
critical view of the Tender Board’s conduct, the High Court did not find that the Board acted in a mala fide 
manner  The court a quo in Steenkamp was also of the view that the reviewable irregularities could not 
“be described as mere innocent errors”  Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board of the Eastern Cape 
004 JOL 393 (Ck) para 57
6 Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd v Eastern Cape Province 999  SA 34 (CkH) 355e-H
7 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 007 3 SA  (CC) para 9
8 Para 0
9 In upholding the exception against the contractual claim, the High Court ruled that the contract became 
void ab initio following the successful review and setting aside of the tender award and as a result there 
could be no contractual damages claim  Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board of the Eastern Cape 
004 JOL 393 (Ck) para 
0 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 007 3 SA  (CC) para 0
 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board of the Eastern Cape 004 JOL 393 (Ck) para 6
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In assessing whether the legal convictions of South African society favoured 
the recognition of a legal duty in instances such as the present, the High Court 
noted a number of public policy considerations that supported such recogni-
tion in principle. These included a finding that the statutory regime underlying 
the functions of the Tender Board was not aimed solely at protecting the inter-
ests of Government, but was also “in the interest of those who tender for the 
delivery of goods and services.”6 No other remedies were provided for in the 
relevant statute, it did not preclude a damages claim and it expressly conferred 
the power to claim damages on the Tender Board, which in the Court’s view 
indicated that the Act did not intend to displace private law remedies.7 The 
Court was not convinced that the possibility of submitting a new tender when 
the Tender Board called for fresh tenders following the review amounted to an 
effective alternative remedy for Balraz.8 Furthermore, the Court described it 
as “unrealistic and unreasonable” to expect the successful tenderer to estab-
lish whether the Tender Board acted lawfully before incurring expenses under 
the awarded tender.9 A successful tenderer was entitled in the Court’s view 
“to assume that the Tender Board complied with its statutory functions.”30 
Finally, the Court found that because of the limited nature of a successful 
tenderer’s claim for out-of-pocket expenses, as well as the narrow class of 
potential claimants represented by successful tenderers such as Balraz, claims 
such as the present did not hold significant cost implications for the public 
purse.3
2 3 The Supreme Court of Appeal judgment32
The Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s ruling, but for 
slightly different reasons. unlike the High Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
did not look favourably upon delictual liability in the current context, either 
generally or specifically on the facts of this case. Having examined a range 
of public policy considerations, the Court held that “an action by tenderers, 
successful or unsuccessful, for delictual damages that are purely economic 
in nature and suffered because of a bona fide and negligent failure to comply 
with the requirements of administrative justice” could not be inferred from 
either the statute in question or the common law generally.33
The Court set out a number of public policy considerations that motivated 
its decision. unlike the High Court, it interpreted the relevant statute as aimed 
at the interests of the province and not tenderers.34 The Act could accordingly 
not support the recognition of a delictual claim in favour of tenderers. With 
reference to earlier decisions that denied claims for lost profits flowing from 
6 Paras 48, 69
7 Para 60
8 Para 6
9 Para 58
30 Para 58
3 Para 64
3 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 006 3 SA 5 (SCA)
33 Para 46
34 Para 30
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administrative errors, the Court noted that there was no principled difference 
between a claim for lost profits and out-of-pocket expenses and that claims for 
the latter are subject to the same considerations as the former.35 The Court was 
furthermore of the view that delictual liability may have an adverse impact on 
the functioning of tender boards and cause them to be overly cautious.36 In a 
key passage the Court stated:
“The chilling effect of the imposition of delictual liability on tender boards in a young democracy with 
limited resources, human and financial, on balance, is real because if liability were to be imposed, the 
potentiality of a claim by every successful tenderer would cast a shadow over the deliberations of a 
tender board on each tender and that may slow the process down or even grind it to a virtual halt.”37
The Court reasoned that there could be no distinction between success-
ful and unsuccessful tenderers in relation to the imposition of a legal duty 
on tender boards and since damages claims were refused to unsuccessful 
tenderers, there could be no legal duty to ground such claims in the hands 
of successful tenderers.38 Likewise, the Court argued that it could find no 
reason why tenderers for public contracts should be allowed a damages claim 
when tenderers for private contracts did not have such claims.39 In general, the 
Court noted that remedies for the breach of administrative law duties should be 
aimed at upholding “the rule of law and [ensuring] effective decision-making 
processes” rather than compensating the aggrieved tenderer.40
2 4 The Constitutional Court judgments41
2 4 1 The majority judgment
The majority of the Constitutional Court per Moseneke DCJ agreed with 
both the finding and reasoning of the Supreme Court of Appeal. They expressly 
endorsed in general the policy considerations that motivated the Supreme 
Court of Appeal’s rejection of delictual liability for negligent, but bona fide 
administrative errors in the award of public tenders causing damages in the 
form of out-of-pocket expenses.4 The Court in particular noted its agree-
ment that the statutory scheme did not contemplate a claim for damages in the 
present context;43 that a tender board could not owe different legal duties to 
successful and unsuccessful tenderers respectively;44 that allowing a delictual 
claim may unduly hamper the functioning of tender boards and consequently 
undermine the entire public procurement system and that such liability will 
place too high a burden on the public purse.45 The Court also noted a number 
of further policy considerations in support of its position.
35 Para 36  
36 Para 37
37 Para 40
38 Para 44
39 Para 45
40 Para 8
4 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 007 3 SA  (CC)
4 Para 55
43 Paras 47, 55
44 Para 54
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The majority found that an initially successful tenderer does have alter-
native remedies open to it. It could firstly submit a new tender when fresh 
tenders are called.46 The Court seems to suggest that the initially success-
ful tenderer has nothing to complain about following such participation in a 
new round of tenders irrespective of the outcome of that second round.47 The 
Court argued in the second place that the “prudent successful tenderer” has 
another alternative remedy available in the form of negotiated risk allocation 
in relation to potential reviews of the tender award.48 The Court suggested 
that successful tenderers, following the award of the tender, should negotiate 
contractual arrangements with the state to govern any subsequent upset of the 
contract.49
Finally, in probably the most astounding part of the majority judgment, it 
criticised Balraz for acting too quickly following the award of the tender.50 
The Court argued that Balraz should have waited before it acted on the tender 
award to see if the award was not challenged on review.5 It is worth quoting 
this paragraph in full:
“On the facts, Balraz wasted no moment to accept the tender award. But once the order to supply 
goods and services was made by the Department, Balraz should have curbed its commercial enthusi-
asm as it was well within its right to require that its initial expenses not lead to its financial ruin should 
the award be nullified. Balraz unnecessarily chose the more hazardous course which is to incur mainly 
salary expenses of its directors without fashioning an appropriate safeguard. Its loss could have been 
easily curbed by prudent conduct and precaution.”5
2 4 2 The dissenting judgment
In their dissenting judgment, Langa CJ and O’Regan J, with the concur-
rence of Mokgoro J, differed with the majority on only one point, namely that 
“normative considerations” did support the recognition of delictual liability 
in the present context.53 While holding that the considerations motivating the 
majority judgment did not persuade them against the recognition of a legal 
duty and were given undue weight by the majority, the minority continued 
to identify a number of “important considerations which serve as counter-
weights” to the factors informing the majority’s position.54
The minority acknowledged that damages claims in the public procurement 
context may place severe burdens on the public purse. As a result they noted 
that denying an unsuccessful tenderer a claim for lost profits is justifiable on 
those grounds.55 However, they argued that a claim by an initially successful 
46 Paras 48-49
47 Para 49: “If Balraz had won the renewed tender would it still be open to it to claim out-of-pocket expenses? 
Again, if it had lost the second tender, complex issues of what caused the loss of the initial out-of-pocket 
expenses would arise ” 
48 Para 50
49 Para 50
50 Paras 5, 5
5 Para 5
5 Para 5
53 Paras 64, 78, 94-95
54 Paras 88-95
55 Para 8
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tenderer for out-of-pocket expenses incurred on the basis of its contractual 
obligations towards the state does not pose a similar threat to public funds.56 
Such claims are much more modest, do not represent a windfall for the tenderer 
and are for expenses actually incurred in good faith.57 In the minority’s view 
these factors were sufficient to justify a departure from earlier judgments in 
which damages claims were refused for administrative errors in public tender 
processes.
In the second place the minority found that one of the purposes of the appli-
cable statutory regime was to give effect to the administrative justice rights 
found in the Constitution58 since the statute governed specific administrative 
action.59 As a result the statute was aimed at the protection of individual ten-
derers, contrary to the majority’s and Supreme Court of Appeal’s views, and 
could cast a legal duty on the tender board towards tenderers.
Thirdly, the minority noted the adverse impact on public procurement if 
damages claims were not allowed.60 They argued that effective and efficient 
government contracting would be undermined if successful tenderers faced 
the prospect of their contracts being set aside without being able to recoup 
expenses already incurred under the contract.6 The minority expressly 
rejected Moseneke DCJ’s criticism of Balraz for being too quick in perform-
ing under the contract. They noted:
“In our view, it would be highly undesirable to suggest that a successful tender applicant should 
hesitate before performing in terms of the contract, in case a challenge to the tender award is suc-
cessfully brought. Such a principle, in our view, would undermine the constitutional commitments 
to efficiency and the need for delivery which are of immense importance to both government and 
citizens alike.”6
Fourthly, the minority argued that denying a damages claim in the present 
context may have significant adverse effects on the use of public procurement 
to further social transformation in South Africa and in particular that of black 
economic empowerment.63 They noted that new black businesses, which can 
be assisted in gaining entry to the market by means of government contracts, 
are often “smaller and less financially viable tenderers at risk of liquidation,” 
“new, small and not financially robust” and “new and small companies unable 
to absorb the costs incurred in performing a contract subsequently declared 
void.”64 Given the importance of these public policies, the minority was of 
the view that society’s sense of justice demanded protection of such new busi-
nesses against financial ruin because of void government contracts.
Finally, the minority was not convinced that a tenderer in Balraz’s posi-
tion has effective alternative remedies available to it. They argued that even 
though the initially successful tenderer may again submit a tender it would 
56 Paras 8, 83, 84
57 Paras 8, 83, 84, 9
58 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 996  
59 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 007 3 SA  (CC) paras 9, 94
60 Paras 83, 86, 94
6 Para 83
6 Para 83
63 Paras 8, 94
64 Paras 8, 94
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not recover its out-of-pocket expenses under the initial contract irrespective of 
the outcome of the second round of tenders.65 The minority furthermore ques-
tioned the viability of Moseneke DCJ’s suggestion that a successful tenderer 
should negotiate contractual protection against any losses resulting from the 
contract being set aside.66 They expressed doubt whether government con-
tracts are concluded in such a way, noting that such contracts are probably 
standard form contracts.67
3  Administratively unjust68 contracts
The Steenkamp matter illustrates how South African law responds to the 
dilemma of administratively unjust or reviewable government contracts. The 
Constitutional Court judgments and in particular the policy considerations 
that motivated those judgments should be evaluated within the framework of 
administratively unjust contracts.
3 1 Contractual solutions
Judged from this perspective the majority’s argument that the successful ten-
derer should protect itself by means of contractual arrangements against losses 
resulting from the contract being set aside is unconvincing. It is difficult to 
see how a contractual provision could protect the private counterparty against 
administrative justice problems such as those under discussion here. If the con-
tract is set aside on review, why would one provision, contemplating just such an 
event, survive to provide the private counterparty with a cause of action?69 Such 
a provision would be tainted by the reviewable irregularity to the same extent 
as the rest of the contract. If Moseneke DCJ is contemplating a separate, and 
somehow independent, contractual arrangement from the main tender contract 
the concerns regarding administratively unjust conduct are simply duplicated.
From a policy point of view it is highly problematic to allow the parties to cir-
cumvent any potential effect of administratively unjust conduct by means of a 
subsequent and ostensibly separate contractual arrangement. If such an arrange-
ment is in principle acceptable, what is to prevent the parties from agreeing that 
the successful tenderer is to receive its full benefit under the contract regardless 
of whether the contract is subsequently reviewed and set aside? Sue Arrowsmith 
notes in the context of restitution claims for performance under ultra vires con-
65 Para 88
66 Para 89
67 Para 89
68 I use the phrase “administratively unjust” to describe any action that falls foul of administrative law 
requirements in general, ie action that contains reviewable irregularities, what may be termed ultra vires 
in most common law jurisdictions  I specifically avoid the term ultra vires given the shift in South African 
law away from the ultra vires doctrine as a foundation of administrative law to the new constitutionalised 
administrative law centered on the notion of administrative justice
69 In the Steenkamp matter the successful tenderer did in fact attempt to rely on a contractual cause of action 
in addition to the delictual claim  The High Court upheld the exception against the contractual claim, 
because the contract became void ab initio following the successful review and setting aside of the tender 
award and as a result there could be no contractual damages claim  Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender 
Board of the Eastern Cape 004 JOL 393 (Ck) para   The majority’s suggested contractual remedy 
would arguably suffer the same fate
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tracts that the policy considerations, which motivated the ultra vires finding 
in the first instance, may also override ordinary market mechanisms such as 
efficient breach.70 The same reasoning applies here. Irrespective of whether the 
contractual protection, which the majority in Steenkamp suggested, forms part 
of the main contract or is a separate, free-standing agreement, the policy con-
siderations that underlie the review and setting aside of the tender award will in 
most instances also hit such attendant agreement.
The minority quite rightly expressed doubts about whether the majority’s 
portrayal of the public contracting process is realistic in their suggestion that a 
contractual arrangement may be an effective alternative remedy. The majori-
ty’s view is not in line with the law or practice governing public procurement 
in South Africa. Public contracting in South Africa is conducted for the 
most part on standard form contracts.7 State contracts are generally drawn 
up by the government and offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis in the tender 
process.7 On national and provincial levels the Treasury Regulations73 under 
the Public Finance Management Act74 provide in relation to public procurement 
that “the accounting officer or accounting authority [of an organ of state] must 
ensure that … bid documentation and the general conditions of a contract are 
in accordance with … the instructions of the National Treasury…”75 National 
Treasury has accordingly issued General Conditions of Contract applicable 
to most public procurement contracts.76 even where these conditions are not 
70 Arrowsmith “Ineffective Transactions, Unjust Enrichment and Problems of Policy” 1989 Legal Studies 
307 3  In Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council; Kleinwort 
Benson Ltd v Sandwell Borough Council [994] 4 All eR 890 99 Hobhouse J said of restitution claims in 
this context: “The application of the principle is subject to the requirement that the courts should not grant 
a remedy which amounts to the direct or indirect enforcement of a contract which the law requires to be 
treated as ineffective ” One finds similar reasoning against allowing the doctrine of estoppel to operate 
against organs of state where such organs exceeded their powers  One of the main reasons why estoppel 
cannot lie in such a case is that it would amount to the validation of what the law in the first instance 
invalidated, ie it would undermine the underlying reasons for limiting the organ of state’s powers  See 
Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (007) 38-40  In Eastern Cape Provincial Government 
v Contractprops 25 (Pty) Ltd 2001 4 SA 142 (SCA) para 13 Marais JA thus declared: “[L]eases were 
concluded which were ultra vires the powers of the department and they cannot be allowed to stand as 
if they were intra vires” and recently in City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v RPM Bricks (Pty) 
Ltd 2007 JOL 19532 (SCA) para 23 Ponnan JA said: “Estoppel cannot … be used in such a way as to give 
effect to what is not permitted or recognised by law  Invalidity must therefore follow uniformly as the 
consequence  That consequence cannot vary from case to case ”
7 Bolton The Law of Government Procurement in South Africa (007)  et seq, 368-369
7 Bolton Government Procurement 368
73 GN R5 in GG 7388 of 005-03-5
74  of 999
75 Reg 6A6 3
76 See Bolton Government Procurement ; National Treasury General Conditions of Contract http://
www treasury gov za/divisions/sf/sc/default aspx (accessed 3 December 007)  Similar arrangements 
exist in relation to procurement on local government level  National Treasury has issued a set of standard 
terms similar to the General Conditions of Contract (“GCC”) applicable at national and provincial levels 
for local government procurement under the Municipal Supply Chain Management Regulations (GN 
R868 GG 27636 of 2005-05-30) promulgated in terms of the Local Government: Municipal Finance 
Management Act 56 of 003 http://www treasury gov za/legislation/mfma/circulars/circular%2025 aspx 
(accessed 3 December 007)  See Bolton Government Procurement 6  
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applicable77 or where scope is left for negotiated terms,78 organs of state have 
very little freedom in such negotiations following a tender process.
If the type of contractual protection that the majority envisaged takes the 
form of “a guarantee, indemnity or security”, sections 66 and 70 of the Public 
Finance Management Act79 place severe restrictions on the conclusion of 
such arrangements. In most instances the joint concurrence of the responsi-
ble member of Cabinet and the Minister of Finance80 is required before such 
agreement can be concluded.8
Furthermore, administrative justice requirements generally, and section 7 
of the Constitution in particular, preclude organs of state and successful ten-
derers from departing from the terms upon which tenders were submitted and 
negotiate individual terms in the subsequent contract.8 The problem with the 
type of post-award contractual arrangement that the majority in Steenkamp 
suggested is that it allocates risk under the contract, which inevitably has 
an impact on price. Since price is the most important factor in the award 
of a tender83 it would be unfair to other (unsuccessful) tenderers if such an 
arrangement was only made after the tender was awarded with subsequent 
price implications.84 In order for the tender process to be fair, competitive and 
transparent85 tenderers will have to be able to estimate the risk involved in the 
proposed contract on the tender documents and on an equal basis. This implies 
that post-award risk reallocation is either not possible at all or should be put 
forward in the tender documents from the outset. If the latter route is followed, 
one can ask how such a position differs from a general delictual legal duty on 
77 The GCC eg do not apply to contracts for immovable property  See clause   of the GCC
78 The GCC allow for Special Conditions of Contract (“SCC”) to supplement the GCC in respect of any 
aspect that is not covered by the GCC  See GCC clause   and National Treasury Practice Note Number 
SCM 1 of 2003 para  3  However, even the SCC are not necessarily open to negotiation between the 
parties  Both the GCC and the relevant Treasury Practice Note suggest that the SCC will be determined 
by the organ of state  At local government level, the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 
000 s 84() allows municipalities to negotiate the terms of a municipal service delivery agreement with 
the successful tenderer following the conclusion of the tender process  This power to negotiate individual 
terms is, however, quite narrow and must proceed on the basis of the tender documents and may not 
“materially affect the bid in a manner which compromises the integrity of the bidding process ” See 
Bolton “Scope for Negotiating and/or Varying the Terms of Government Contracts Awarded by way of a 
Tender Process” 2006 Stell LR 66 79-80
79  of 999
80 On provincial level the concurrence of the MeC for finance is required
8 Public Finance Management Act  of 999 s 66 read with s 70  Note, however, that while the National 
Treasury in a Circular on Contracts Containing Provisions Relating to Indemnities, Limitations of 
Liability and Warranties of 005-09-0 acknowledged that the Public Finance Management Act probably 
requires the written concurrence of the Minister of Finance for all such agreements, Treasury adopted the 
practice that such concurrence is not necessary in relation to contracts where “the indemnity, limitation 
of liability or warranty is integral or incidental to expenditure that has already been approved by the 
relevant legislature or executive authority in the annual budget of the department/constitutional institu-
tion or public entity respectively; and such indemnity, limitation of liability or warranty is necessitated 
by the day-to-day operational requirements of the department, constitutional institution or public entity, 
which include the acquisition of equipment such as photocopiers, PABX boards and computer hardware, 
the procurement of professional services and the hosting of events ”
8 Bolton 006 Stell LR 77
83 Price is directly related to the principle of “cost-effectiveness” that is listed in s 217(1) of the Constitution as 
one of the basic requirements of all public procurement  Consequently the framework for the implementation 
of preferential procurement policies in terms of s  of the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 
000 allocates primary importance to price in the preference point system used to adjudicate tenders
84 See Bolton 006 Stell LR 77-79
85 See s 7() of the Constitution
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the tender board, at least vis-à-vis the successful tenderer. Questions of public 
trust also emerge from this latter option. If an organ of state offers some form 
of indemnity for its potential administrative errors right at the start of the 
tender process, ie in the tender documents, it may create significant adverse 
perceptions about its own reliability, fuelling uncertainty and undermining 
trust between the organ of state and private contracting parties.86
3 2 Allocating the administrative injustice risk
The effect of the majority judgment in Steenkamp is to place the risk that the 
government contract is administratively unjust and is subsequently set aside on 
review, which one may call an administrative injustice risk in South Africa,87 
on the successful tenderer, ie the private party to the contract. This allocation 
of risk is unfortunate and may have far-reaching adverse consequences for 
government contracting in South Africa. The most significant implication is 
one of costs, which directly contradicts the cost-saving aims of the majority 
in Steenkamp. The refusal to apply private law regulation (delictual liability) 
in favour of public law regulation (judicial review) results in the highly ineffi-
cient outcome of forcing all private parties to internalise the risk of government 
contracts being set aside (or even just significantly delayed) in judicial review 
proceedings. In other words, the mere possibility of judicial review linked to the 
potential absence of a damages remedy for costs legitimately incurred under the 
contract and prior to it being set aside, increases the risk of the private party and 
will force parties to hedge against that risk,88 with the resultant cost passed on 
to the state. Tenderers will typically offer lower prices when the state is selling 
and ask higher prices when the state is buying in order to off-set the higher 
transaction costs brought about by the higher risk.
This outcome is highly inefficient for a number of reasons. Firstly, the state 
is undoubtedly better placed to minimise administrative injustice risks than the 
private party.89 An efficient approach will thus place that risk on the state, which 
86 See Davies “English Law’s Treatment of Government Contracts: The Problem of Wider Public Interests” 
in Freedland & Auby (eds) The Public/Private Law Divide (006) 5 where she makes a similar argu-
ment in relation to negotiated solutions to regulatory changes affecting government contracts
87 This seems to be a suitable phrase since the risk is grounded on the eventuality of a court ruling that the 
administrative justice rights in s 33 of the Constitution have been breached in the tender process
88 The fact that, following Steenkamp, a damages remedy will be absent where administrators made an honest 
mistake means that private parties do not have to take an overly pessimistic view of state conduct for them 
to perceive and hence protect against this risk  There is thus no room for an argument that such risk averse 
conduct is somehow unwarranted, against public policy or even immoral, as may be arguable where private 
parties expect the state to act in bad faith and accordingly hedge against such contingency
89 In rejecting the argument that the absence of restitution claims under ultra vires contracts creates an incen-
tive for private contractors to “check that a contract is authorised”, Sue Arrowsmith notes that “the scope 
of public authorities’ statutory powers is notoriously uncertain, and a contractor cannot reasonably be 
expected to know whether or not a contract is ultra vires.” Arrowsmith 1989 Legal Studies 307 3-3  The 
same reasoning applies in the present context  The private contracting party’s disadvantage in this context 
is increased where the reviewable irregularity relates to more “subjective” factors, such as improper motive 
(cf the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”) s 6(2)(e)(ii)) or reliance on irrelevant 
considerations (cf PAJA s 6()(e)(iii)), rather than more easily verifiable objective factors relating to the 
state’s formal capacity to enter into transactions  eg in the Steenkamp matter the contract was set aside on 
grounds which would be extremely difficult for a private contracting party to verify before concluding the 
contract, see Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd v Eastern Cape Province 999  SA 34 (CkH) 348
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in the present context means placing delictual liability on the state. Secondly, 
allowing delictual liability in the limited number of instances where a state 
contract is set aside upon review may amount to higher costs for the state in 
those instances, but has the wider effect of removing a similar risk on private 
parties in all other state contracts, with the result that private parties have no 
need to protect against such risk. Accordingly, the costs of all state contracts 
are reduced.90 Thirdly, as Anne Davies notes in relation to ultra vires contracts 
in english law, placing such risk on private contractors may result in “some 
potential contractors [being] deterred from bidding for government business 
at all, thus reducing the range of choices open to the government during the 
tendering process.”9 The last two considerations are particularly important 
in the South African context. As the dissenting minority in Steenkamp noted, 
public procurement plays a crucial role in transforming South African society, 
specifically in relation to economic empowerment. It is accordingly impor-
tant to remove potential obstacles facing new black entrants to the market in 
government business. Given the “less financially viable”9 nature of many of 
these previously disadvantaged enterprises, an administrative injustice risk 
will undoubtedly pose a significant obstacle. Steenkamp’s allocation of risk 
will consequently not only undermine the South African government’s choice 
in relation to the competitive dimension (ie price or cost) of public procure-
ment, but also its choice in relation to empowerment partners. It is suggested 
that this will be immensely detrimental to the broad based nature of black 
economic empowerment in South Africa93 by limiting access to government 
business to a relatively small number of established and financially robust 
black repeat players.
There is a further implication of the majority’s allocation of risk in 
Steenkamp that merits particular attention in the South African context. 
In terms of the majority judgment the cost of bona fide administrative 
errors in public tender adjudication is placed on one individual or firm, 
namely the successful tenderer. This seems highly unfair since the benefit 
of administrative justice underlying the review of such errors is a benefit 
to society as a whole.94 Consequently, the cost of upholding administrative 
justice should be “shared throughout the community.”95 When one adds 
the transformation dimension of public procurement to this picture, the 
90 Davies “Ultra Vires Problems in Government Contracts” 2006 LQR 98 114-115: “It might be cheaper to 
compensate contractors on the rare occasions when a contract is held to be void, than to pay an inflated 
price in every contract ”
9 Davies 006 LQR 5
9 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 007 3 SA  (CC) para 8 (per Langa CJ and 
O’Regan J)
93 See the preamble to the Broad-Based Black economic empowerment Act 53 of 003, which states as one 
of its objectives to “promote the achievement of the constitutional right to equality, increase broad-based 
and effective participation of black people in the economy ”
94 This benefit is in its most basic form that of upholding the rule of law and the related principle of legality  
See Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 3 SA 121 (CC) para 29: “Ultimately the 
purpose of a public remedy is … at a broader level, to entrench the rule of law”; Hoexter Administrative 
Law in South Africa 0 et seq; Baxter Administrative Law (984) 639.
95 Davies 006 LQR 99  Also see Baxter Administrative Law 64
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argument for distributing the cost of administrative irregularities through-
out society becomes even stronger. It seems anomalous to place the cost 
of implementing key transformation initiatives on the very people that the 
initiatives aim to empower. The cost of realising transformation objectives 
in South Africa should be carried by society at large.96
3 3 Efficient performance under government contracts
Apart from the adverse cost implications of the majority judgment in 
Steenkamp, it also impacts negatively on efficient performance under 
public contracts. The majority judgment effectively created a “standstill 
period” for all government contracts awarded by means of public tender 
in South Africa.97 During this period following the award of the tender, no 
further action should be taken in terms of the contract until such time as 
the administrative injustice risk has passed. In Steenkamp that standstill 
period amounted to more than a year.98 Despite the majority’s offhand state-
ment that “in the ordinary course tenderers who dispute the correctness of 
an award would challenge its correctness relatively quickly”, this standstill 
period can severely undermine prompt performance under government con-
tracts. In terms of section 7() of the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act (PAJA),99future judicial review proceedings must be instituted “without 
unreasonable delay and not later than 180 days” after any internal remedies 
have been exhausted or, in the absence of any such remedies, after the person 
concerned was informed of the decision and its reasons. However, section 
9()(b) of PAJA provides for the extension of the 80 day period by agree-
ment between the parties or by the court. While a 80 day minimum period 
is a much shorter period of time than the year that lapsed in Steenkamp, 
it is still a significant delay in the execution of a commercial transaction. 
It should also be kept in mind that the 80 day limit is only the period in 
which the review proceedings should be instituted and that the conclusion 
of such proceedings, including potential appeals, may drag the matter out 
96 This is implicit in the preamble to the Constitution where “[w]e, the people of South Africa” collectively 
commits to the transformation of South African society
97 This bit of judicial law-making is quite ironic given the majority’s expressed view that “[in] these circum-
stances to infer a remedy judicially would be to venture far beyond the field of statutory construction or 
constitutional interpretation,” quoting with approval Cameron JA’s remarks in Olitzki Property Holdings 
v State Tender Board 00 3 SA 47 (SCA)  Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 
007 3 SA  (CC) para 47  
98 The tender was awarded to Balraz in March 996 and the contract was set aside upon review in June 007  
Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 007 3 SA  (CC) paras 7-8
99 Future applications for review similar to that in Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd v Eastern Cape 
Province 999  SA 34 (CkH) will be governed by PAJA  See para 4 below for a more comprehensive 
discussion of the impact of PAJA on cases such as Steenkamp.
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much longer.00 Such delays inevitably have a negative impact on govern-
ment effectiveness and efficiency.0
4  The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act
Although PAJA did not apply to the facts in Steenkamp,0 all the judgments 
made express reference to it.03 In his brief concurring minority judgment, 
Sachs J placed particular emphasis on the remedy provisions in PAJA.04 
This is not surprising seeing that PAJA will clearly apply to similar cases in 
future.05 Two related questions emerge in this regard. Firstly, does PAJA pro-
vide an effective remedy to a claimant in Balraz’s position in the Steenkamp 
matter? And secondly, can the Court’s refusal to recognise delictual liability 
in this instance be understood in the light of the future role of PAJA in a 
similar context? In his concurring minority judgment, Sachs J noted:
“Just compensation today can be achieved where necessary by means of PAJA … Such an equitable, 
constitutionally-based public law remedy was not pleaded or debated in this case. Had it been, the 
00 The presence of internal remedies will further increase the delay since the 80 day period will only com-
mence following the finalisation of internal remedies  For a discussion of various internal remedies available 
in government procurement processes, see Bolton Government Procurement 30-3  even in the absence 
of internal remedies, the 80 day period may in practice be considerably extended when the right to reasons 
is kept in mind  PAJA s 7()(b) states that the 80 day period is calculated from the date upon which the 
person concerned is informed of the decision and the reasons for the decision  However, there is no general 
duty on administrators to supply reasons with all decisions under PAJA  An affected person has the right 
to request reasons under s 5() of PAJA and only then will there be a duty on the administrator to provide 
reasons  PAJA s 5() allows the affected person 90 days following the date upon which she became aware of 
the decision to request reasons and s 5() subsequently allows the administrator another 90 days to provide 
such reasons  It follows that there is an initial maximum 80 day period following the date upon which the 
affected person became aware of the decision during which reasons is to be requested and provided and 
only following that initial maximum 80 day period will the 80 day period in terms of s 7() for launching 
judicial review proceedings start to run  It is thus possible that the time limit on bringing judicial review 
proceedings will only expire 360 days after the decision was taken
0 Cf Arrowsmith’s criticism of the “mandatory standstill period” under the European Community 
Directive 89/665 on remedies for the enforcement of european Community procurement rules as inter-
preted by the european Court of Justice in Case C-8/90, Alcatel Austria AG v Bundesministerium fur 
Wissenchaft und Verkehr, 999 eCR I-767  In this case the european Court of Justice held that the 
Directive’s requirement that states provide an effective set-aside remedy against public procurement 
award decisions necessitates a national remedy system that allows for the challenge of award deci-
sions prior to the conclusion of the relevant public contract  The european Commission interpreted 
this ruling to require a mandatory standstill period between award decision and conclusion of the 
contract during which challenges to the award decision can be brought  The united Kingdom initially 
implemented the european Court of Justice’s ruling by allowing for a limited period following the 
conclusion of the public contract to challenge the award of the contract  However, under pressure from 
the european Commission, the united Kingdom eventually also introduced a mandatory standstill 
period  Arrowsmith “The Past and Future Evolution of EC Procurement Law: From Framework to 
Common Code?” 2006 Public Contract Law Journal 337 378  The mandatory standstill period has 
subsequently been taken up in a proposed eC directive amending the current remedies directives with 
regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts  
This directive, proposed by the european Commission, was approved by the european Parliament and 
is currently awaiting approval by the Council  
0 The tender award was set aside in June 997, while PAJA only came into operation in November 000
03 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 007 3 SA  (CC) paras , 30 (per Moseneke 
DCJ), 96-98 (per Langa CJ and O’Regan J), 99-0 (per Sachs J)  
04 Paras 99-0
05 It is now beyond doubt that the adjudication and award of public tenders in South Africa constitute admin-
istrative action and are accordingly subject to PAJA  See Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, 
Eastern Cape 007 3 SA  (CC) para 
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problems acknowledged in the minority and majority judgments could have been resolved in a fair, 
balanced and practical way.”06
The dissenting judgment similarly noted a potential compensation claim in 
terms of PAJA in future instances.07 The realisation of this potential is, how-
ever, doubtful for a number of reasons. Section 8()(c)(ii) of PAJA provides 
for the payment of compensation by “the administrator or any other party 
to the proceedings” only “in exceptional cases.” The majority’s emphasis on 
this narrowly restricted nature of a compensation claim under PAJA suggests 
that the Court did not view the present instance as sufficiently exceptional 
to merit compensation.08 It is submitted that the expressed policy consid-
erations, which ostensibly moved the majority to reject delictual liability in 
Steenkamp, will have a similar negative impact on the success of a compensa-
tion claim under PAJA in comparable future cases. Most, if not all, of those 
considerations are unrelated to the specific delictual nature of the claim in 
Steenkamp.09 Despite the judicial analysis in that case being couched in 
terms of the delictual element of wrongfulness, the expressed policy consid-
erations would accordingly undermine any compensation claim for expenses 
incurred following the award of a public tender, but prior to it being set aside 
upon review, regardless of the legal pedigree of the claim. Basing the claim on 
PAJA, rather than in delict, would make no difference to arguments such as 
the availability of alternative remedies in the form of contractual protection or 
proceeding with caution; the impact on the public purse and the functioning 
of tender boards.
even if one can surmount the adverse policy considerations listed by the 
majority in Steenkamp to convince a court that compensation in terms of PAJA 
is justifiable in a similar future case, it is not clear that a successful tenderer 
will ever be able to rely on PAJA’s compensation remedy. Such a claimant 
faces significant procedural obstacles in the way of a compensation claim. 
The remedies listed in section 8 of PAJA are only available “in proceedings 
for judicial review in terms of section 6(1)” of the Act.0 Consequently, a 
section 8()(c)(ii) compensation claim will only be possible in the original 
review application and not as an independent claim subsequent to the review 
and setting aside of the tender award. In other words, a compensation claim 
in terms of PAJA would not have been available in Steenkamp even if the Act 
06 Paras 0-0
07 Para 97: “It may well be that the power to direct the payment of compensation conferred by section 
8()(c)(ii)(bb) will result in the development of administrative law principles governing the payment of 
compensation to vindicate the constitutional right to administrative justice ”
08 See para 30  There is no more than a hint or suggestion to this effect in the majority judgment, since they 
expressly noted that “[i]t is unnecessary to speculate on when cases are exceptional  That question will 
have to be left to the specific context of each case ”
09 See Darson Construction (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 007 4 SA 488 (C) 509D-F where the judge 
with reference to Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2006 3 SA 151 (SCA) said: 
“Mindful of the fact that the award of constitutional damages is not to be confused with delictual liability, 
I am nevertheless of the view that the practical considerations behind the policy which has led courts to 
decline to recognise the delictual claims of unsuccessful tenderers (and successful tenderers who are 
subsequently ousted) for loss of profits carry considerable weight when deciding, on the facts of this case, 
whether an award of applicant’s loss of profit is ‘just and equitable’ and an appropriate remedy ”
0 PAJA s 8()
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was operative at the relevant time. This places the successful tenderer in an 
extremely difficult position. In the review application the successful tenderer 
will inevitably be cited as a respondent along with the relevant organ of state 
and/or tender board that awarded the contract. The successful tenderer’s inter-
ests will also generally be aligned with that of the organ of state in keeping 
the contract alive. It is thus to be expected that the successful tenderer would 
want to make out a case that the tender process was conducted in a lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair manner. However, as soon as the reviewing 
court sets the contract aside, the successful tenderer’s interests undergo a 80 
degree turn and come to stand diametrically opposite that of the organ of 
state. In order to recover its losses it is now in the initially successful ten-
derer’s interests to point out the errors in the award procedure and pin the 
blame on the organ of state. It is not clear that prevailing rules of procedure 
provide adequate scope for such a course of action by the initially successful 
tenderer. Theoretically a reviewing court may order compensation in terms 
of PAJA to the initially successful tenderer when it sets the contract aside. 
However, such a compensation order is unlikely to accompany a successful 
review application in practice. The issue of compensation would mostly not 
have been aired because of the initially successful tenderer’s alignment with 
the organ of state during the review application. This places the reviewing 
court in a difficult position regarding compensation orders since it will mostly 
not have the necessary evidentiary material in front of it to grant such an order 
and the organ of state would not have had an opportunity to address the court 
on the issue of compensation to one of its co-respondents. The restriction of 
compensation orders to “exceptional cases” also continues to raise particular 
difficulty in this respect. Whereas one would expect an applicant in a review, 
in the present context an unsuccessful tenderer, to put arguments before the 
court enabling it to decide on the exceptional remedy of substitution in section 
8()(c)(ii)(aa) of PAJA, the same is not true for the exceptional compensation 
remedy in subsection (bb). It is the successful tenderer, normally a respondent 
in a review of the tender award, that would typically need to put arguments 
before the court enabling it to decide whether the case is sufficiently excep-
tional to merit a compensation remedy. The conflicting alignment experienced 
by the successful tenderer respondent accordingly remains. While these pro-
 The inclusion of the word “and” preceding s 8(1)(c)(ii) of PAJA seems to suggest that a compensation 
order is only available in conjunction with an order setting the relevant administrative action aside 
rather than as a free-standing order  See SLC Property Group (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and Economic Development (Western Cape) CPD 6-0-007 case no 554/007 para 55; Darson 
Construction (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 007 4 SA 488 (C) 50F-G  
 The fact that reviews are mostly brought on motion proceedings adds to this problem since the reviewing 
court would not have heard evidence on damages, which will mostly be fatal to any potential compensa-
tion order  See Darson Construction (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 007 4 SA 488 (C) 509G: “Damages 
are by their very nature unliquidated  It is the Courts’ task after hearing evidence to quantify damages ” 
Since the initially successful tenderer is also not the one instituting the review proceedings, it has no 
control over what procedure is adopted at the outset  Also see Hoexter Administrative Law in South 
Africa 503: “The motion procedure associated with administrative review (and currently embodied in 
Rule 53) is in any event not designed for the resolution of disputes of fact, which tend to crop up in claims 
for damages,” quoted with approval in SLC Property Group (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and Economic Development (Western Cape) CPD 6-0-007 case no 554/007 para 56
WORSE THAN LOSING A GOVERNMENT TENDER: WINNING IT 117
cedural problems are not insurmountable, they do raise questions regarding 
the adequacy of current judicial review mechanisms, especially in relation to 
remedies, in the context of public procurement.
The unconvincing nature of the expressed policy considerations that 
informed the majority judgment in Steenkamp linked to the obiter references 
to future compensation in terms of PAJA leads one to wonder whether there 
are other, largely unexpressed considerations really at work in Steenkamp. 
Perhaps Sachs J’s overt reliance on PAJA provides a way of understanding 
the outcome in Steenkamp. In a key passage Sachs J stated: “[I]t would not 
only be jurisprudentially inelegant and functionally duplicatory to permit 
remedies under constitutionalised administrative law, and remedies under the 
common law, to function side by side. It would be constitutionally impermis-
sible.”3 As a result he was “unconvinced that it is appropriate to develop 
private law remedies”4 in aid of initially successful tenderers such as Balraz. 
This approach of Sachs J goes back and is true to the foundational ruling of 
the Constitutional Court in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA 
and Another: In re Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others5 where Chaskalson P held that
“[t]here are not two systems of law, each dealing with the same subject-matter, each having similar 
requirements, each operating in its own field with its own highest Court. There is only one system of 
law. It is shaped by the Constitution which is the supreme law …”6
These motivations provide a much more compelling reason for rejecting 
delictual liability in the context of administrative errors in the adjudication of 
public tenders than the policy considerations listed by the majority in Steenkamp. 
Given the applicability of PAJA to the adjudication of public tenders and its 
express provision for the award of compensation, it seems appropriate in prin-
ciple, based on the single system approach in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 
to reject a parallel remedy in terms of the law of delict. However, it still seems 
highly unfair to deny the deserving claimant in Steenkamp relief in the name 
of coherent and principled legal development. In my view Sachs J also effec-
tively provided a way out of this dilemma by rightly pointing out that the 
compensation remedy now found in PAJA could have been grounded directly 
on the Constitution in the absence of PAJA.7
5  Remedies in public procurement reviews
The real issue raised by the Steenkamp matter is not whether delictual 
liability should attach to bona fide errors of organs of state in the public pro-
curement context, but rather the unsophisticated approach of courts to the 
judicial review of public contract decisions. The difficulties illustrated by 
Steenkamp arise not necessarily because of administrative errors by public 
procurement officials, but because of the legal treatment of those errors. The 
3 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 007 3 SA  (CC) para 99
4 Para 0
5 000  SA 674 (CC)
6 Para 44
7 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 007 3 SA  (CC) paras 99-00  
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traditional approach in judicial review proceedings has been to simply set 
the state action aside when a reviewable irregularity is found to exist.8 This 
approach is simplistic and does not adequately take account of the complex 
nature of public procurement disputes. There is no reason, however, why this 
should be the case. The remedies regime in South Africa in relation to judicial 
review of state conduct has always been a fairly flexible one.9 The setting 
aside of administrative action upon review was at common law and continues 
to be in terms of the Constitution and PAJA0 a discretionary remedy. The 
remedy provisions of the Constitution and PAJA clearly allow significant 
scope for courts to develop and apply remedies suitable to specific circum-
stances. The recent judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Millennium 
Waste Management v Chairperson Tender Board illustrates the possibility 
of crafting suitable orders from this broad and flexible remedies framework. 
This judgment signifies a decisive step away from a simplistic legal response 
to reviewable irregularities in public tender cases. In order to foster this 
development there is a need to engage in further analysis of appropriate legal 
remedies in the public procurement context. It is not the purpose of this con-
tribution to embark on that analysis. However, a few remarks regarding the 
outline of such an analysis flowing from the Steenkamp and Millenium Waste 
Management decisions are necessary.
There is a danger, evident in the majority judgment in Steenkamp,3 that 
judicial scrutiny of public procurement decisions could result in the polari-
sation of the issues as either public or private in nature. This results in the 
available and relevant remedies being perceived as either of a public law or 
of a private law nature. The problem with this adherence to the public/private 
law distinction is that public procurement falls squarely within both public 
and private law. Disputes relating to public procurement cannot adequately 
be conceptualised in terms of the public/private law distinction. Prior to 994 
there was a tendency in South African law to conceptualise public contract-
8 Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 464-465; Baxter Administrative Law 678  See eg Selikowitz 
J’s recent statement in relation to tender decisions in Darson Construction (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 
007 4 SA 488 (C) 500G: “Where an unauthorised ‘administrator’ acts, its actions are clearly reviewable 
and cannot be upheld ”
9 See Baxter Administrative Law 674-676; Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 46-465  
0 S 8(1) of PAJA states: “The court … in proceedings for judicial review … may grant any order that is just 
and equitable” echoing s 38 of the Constitution, which empowers a court to “grant appropriate relief” 
where a right in the Bill of Rights (including the s 33 right to administrative justice) has been infringed 
and s 172(1)(b), which states that a court “deciding a constitutional matter” may “make any order that is 
just and equitable ” 
 Baxter Administrative Law 678; Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 465-466  
 007 JOL 70 (SCA)
3 See Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 007 3 SA  (CC) para 9 where it is 
stated: “It is … appropriate to note that ordinarily a breach of administrative justice attracts public law 
remedies and not private law remedies  The purpose of a public law remedy is to pre-empt or correct or 
reverse an improper administrative function  In some instances the remedy takes the form of an order to 
make or not to make a particular decision or an order declaring rights or an injunction to furnish reasons 
for an adverse decision  ultimately the purpose of a public remedy is to afford the prejudiced party 
administrative justice, to advance efficient and effective public administration compelled by constitu-
tional precepts and at a broader level, to entrench the rule of law” and para 30 where the majority declared 
in relation to the remedies regime in PAJA: “Suffice it for this purpose to observe that the remedies 
envisaged by section 8 are in the main of a public law and not private law character ”
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ing as simply a matter of private contract4 with the result that many of the 
peculiarities of public contracts were overlooked.5 The private law remedies 
that were exclusively granted in terms of that approach furthermore failed 
to provide adequate protection to the individuals affected.6 under the new 
constitutional regime a different trend has emerged to view public contract-
ing as a matter of administrative action and hence subject to administrative 
law regulation.7 It is submitted that if this trend results in the exclusion of 
private law remedies in favour of exclusive reliance on public law remedies, 
as Steenkamp seems to suggest, the development of an effective remedy 
regime for public procurement disputes will be undermined. Given the hybrid 
legal nature of public procurement it is imperative to develop remedies that 
draw on both public and private law rules. Such remedies should “uphold 
the rule of law and ensure effective decision-making processes”,8 but at 
the same time refrain from unduly hampering state commercial dealings by 
imposing a too high regulatory burden. They should protect the particular 
interests of the parties involved in the transaction and aim to realise the 
commercial rationale behind the transaction while also protecting public 
interest against abuse of public power. In essence, the ideal combined approach 
should generate a synergy between the control functions of public law rules 
and the facilitating functions of private law rules.9
An effective remedies regime must also take particular notice of the 
multilateral nature of public procurement disputes and move away from the 
traditional bipolar perspective familiar to the litigation process. The trilateral 
nature of the interests involved in the original judicial review that resulted in 
the Steenkamp case underscores this point. As argued above, PAJA’s remedy 
provisions and in particular the compensation remedy in section 8()(c)(ii), 
provide particular difficulties in this regard. Sue Arrowsmith’s argument 
that “the court should take account of the interests of the party awarded the 
contract, particularly if he has begun preparation or performance in igno-
rance of any dispute over the award decision”30 is accordingly also of specific 
relevance in the South African context. In this regard Jafta JA’s judgment in 
Millennium Waste Management v Chairperson Tender Board3 is of particu-
4 See the detailed analysis of this jurisprudence by Cora Hoexter in Hoexter “Contracts in Administrative 
Law: Life after Formalism?” 2004 SALJ 595 and Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 47 et seq. 
Also see Pretorius “The Defence of the Realm: Contract and Natural Justice” 2002 SALJ 374; Cockrell 
“‘Can You Paradigm?’ – Another Perspective on the Public Law/Private Law Divide” 1993 Acta Juridica 
7
5 Also see Baxter Administrative Law 59 who refers inter alia in the context of public contracts to “exam-
ples where judges seem to have ignored the ‘third dimension’ of disputes, treating them instead as if 
they merely involved private parties, each free to exercise their powers and vindicate their rights as they 
wish ”
6 Hoexter 004 SALJ 60-604
7 See Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 007 3 SA  (CC) para  and the cases 
quoted there in note 4
8 See Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 006 3 SA 5 (SCA) para 8
9 As Anne Davies notes: “The challenge is therefore to find a set of remedies which would vindicate the 
Rule of Law, whilst at the same time protecting contractors’ expectations and (where relevant) preventing 
undue disruption to public services where a concluded contract is at issue ” Davies 2006 LQR 98 5
30 Arrowsmith “Enforcing the EC Public Procurement Rules: The Remedies System in England and Wales” 
99 Public Procurement LR 9 0
3 007 JOL 70 (SCA)
0 STeLL LR 008 
lar interest. In approaching the formulation of an appropriate remedy in the 
public tender dispute before the Court, the judge stated:
“The difficulty that is presented by invalid administrative acts … is that they often have been acted 
upon by the time they are brought under review. That difficulty is particularly acute when a decision is 
taken to accept a tender. A decision to accept a tender is almost always acted upon immediately by the 
conclusion of a contract with the tenderer, and that is often immediately followed by further contracts 
concluded by the tenderer in executing the contract. To set aside the decision to accept the tender, with 
the effect that the contract is rendered void from the outset, can have catastrophic consequences for an 
innocent tenderer, and adverse consequences for the public at large in whose interests the administra-
tive body or official purported to act. Those interests must be carefully weighed against those of the 
disappointed tenderer if an order is to be made that is just and equitable.”3
Based on this acute understanding of the complexity involved in public 
tender disputes, the Court managed to formulate a creative and highly suitable 
remedy. It conditioned the setting aside of the tender award upon an evalua-
tion by the tender board of the appellant’s incorrectly excluded tender against 
that of the successful tenderer.33 The initial award decision would be set aside 
only if the tender board resolved that the tender ought to have been awarded to 
the appellant. Furthermore, the initially successful tenderer remained entitled 
to all moneys due to it under the contract up to the setting aside of the tender 
award, ie the original contract did not become void ab initio following a set-
ting aside of the adjudication decision. As Jafta JA correctly noted: “The order 
envisaged here maintains a balance between the parties’ conflicting interests 
while taking into account the public interest.”34
6  Conclusion
The Steenkamp matter illustrates the complexity involved in the judicial 
scrutiny of public procurement. The recognition of the public law dimension 
of state contracting is certainly a welcome development in South African law, 
but only if it constitutes the first step in the development of a coherent and 
integrated legal approach to such state activity. The majority judgment of the 
Constitutional Court in Steenkamp did not advance this development. If the 
unsophisticated approach to the judicial treatment of government contracts 
and tender awards is kept up, winning a state tender may just result in a fate 
worse than losing that tender. However, the judgment in Millennium Waste 
Management v Chairperson Tender Board suggests that South African courts 
are moving towards a more sophisticated approach to judicial remedies in 
public contract disputes. This is an important development and should be sup-
ported by further analysis in this area.
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WORSE THAN LOSING A GOVERNMENT TENDER: WINNING IT 121
SUMMARY
In Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 007 3 SA  (CC) the Constitutional 
Court held that an organ of state was not liable in delict for a successful tenderer’s out-of-pocket losses 
following the setting aside of the tender because of a bona fide error on the part of that organ of state 
in the tender process. The Court ruled that the organ of state’s negligent but bona fide conduct in the 
public tender process was not wrongful since it owed no legal duty to tenderers, whether successful 
or unsuccessful, to avoid such losses and that there were no public policy considerations that justified 
the recognition of such a duty. From a public procurement perspective, this judgment is unfortunate. 
Moseneke DCJ’s majority judgment is based on a number of highly contestable assumptions and holds 
implications for public procurement that may largely undermine the very public policy considera-
tions upon which it is based. The dissenting minority judgment of Langa CJ and O’Regan J is to be 
preferred, because it is not only much more sensitive to the general realities of public procurement, 
but specifically the realities of South African public procurement. However, the problem raised by the 
Steenkamp matter, judged from a public procurement perspective, is not one of delictual liability but 
rather the hitherto fairly unsophisticated approach to remedies following the judicial review of public 
tender decisions in South Africa. In order to overcome the problems illustrated by the Steenkamp 
case, we should focus our attention on the development of appropriate judicial review remedies within 
the public procurement context. The recent judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Millennium 
Waste Management v Chairperson Tender Board 007 JOL 70 (SCA) provides a solid point of 
departure for such a development.
